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"Reading for Life": 1 Martha C. Nussbaum
on Philosophy and Literature
RICHARD ELDRIDGE

Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy
and Literature. (Oxford University Press, 1990), xix + 403
pages, $42.50.

WHAT

is it to understand something? According
to the modern extensionalist view of the world, to understand
an object is to know its measurable properties, such as its mass,
location, and velocity. Knowledge of these properties of an
object furnishes us with knowledge of possibilities for manipulating it. Within this modern view, the paradigm form for the
expression of understanding is the scientific report or treatise,
which lists the procedures employed for obtaining measurements, the measurements so obtained, and the possibilities for
interaction with other objects that the measured object is thus
known to possess.
The philosophical theory of this form of understanding in
turn naturally models itself on its scientific object. A measure or
criterion is sought for when understanding has measured its
objects correctly. In this way, the treatise on the proper employment of the understanding becomes the central textual form of
modern philosophy.
When moral philosophy is done within this paradigm, it naturally focuses on the measurement of human action. Having thus
understood physical objects and the understanding itself, it then
becomes natural to ask "What will persons do in such and such
circumstances?" The most thoroughly developed modern scientific forms for the understanding of persons all share in this
effort to measure the determinants of action. This effort is the
common thread linking such otherwise divergent research
programs as behaviorist psychology, cognitivist psychology,
economic revealed preference theory, game theory, and dispositional personality theory. These enterprises all seek neutral,
detached control of their object, the human person.
Martha Nussbaum is not pursuing this form of the understanding of persons. Instead, the sort of human understanding
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that she pursues "does not even attempt to approach the world
as it might be in itself, uninterpreted, unhumanized. Its raw
material is the history of human social experience, which is
already an interpretation and a measure" (164). Her reasons for
rejecting the modern paradigm for the understanding of persons
and preferring instead the textures of understandings to be
found in novels and other narratives include such thoughts as
these. There is no stably measurable and controllable object
there. A human life- any human life-is instead a shifting mixture of envisionings of ideals, responses to historical inheritances of possibilities of action and expression, and promptings
of unruly desire. It displays historically and biologically constrained exercises-courageous or cowardly, moving or repulsive, vicious or virtuous as may be - of self-responsible selfcreation. Measurement can investigate some of the historical
and biological constraints on these exercises, and it can sometimes usefully suggest therapies involving the alterations of these
constraints through behavioral modification or drugs. But measurement cannot capture the courage or creativity or love that
human beings sometimes display in response to the conditions
that constrain their action. And since similar courage or creativity or love are likewise possibilities for us, we who reflect on the
actions and lives of others, the serious investigator of human
action is not external to her object. She is called upon to love or
to reject it, discovering in it either revelations or denigrations of
her own best possibilities of human life.
Love's Knowledge is the record of Martha Nussbaum's loves
for and disappointments with some major texts that claim to
describe and to embody human wisdom. Nussbaum's attention
in these essays- most of them published previously between
1983 and 1990 to wide notice- ranges across the texts of Plato
and Aristotle in philosophy, of Homer, Dickens, Proust, Beckett, Beattie, and above all Henry James in narrative literature,
and of Stanley Fish and Wayne C. Booth in literary theory, with
brief glances at numerous related figures. Always she is con. cerned to ask: How do the writers and the characters who are
their various imaginative vehicles love? In what friendships,
activities, and forms of self-understanding do they place their
energies and trusts, and with what results? How am l to learn
from and against them to inhabit my own friendships, assume
my own ways of being, and develop my own self-understand-
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ings? How am I, as a human being subject to various forces and
constraints, and open to various narrative possibilities, to live
well?
Among the forces and constraints in play in a human life,
Nussbaum mentions such things as these. There are historical
inheritances of complex forms of personal expression and
action. Maggie Verver and Strether, for example, are Americans
of quite particular gender, class, geographic, and family backgrounds. The Prince, and Marcel, and David Copperfield are
Italian, and French, and English. While each of these figures evidences capabilities of self-transformation in moving in some
measure away from the forms of expression they have inherited,
their characters are also evident not only or principally in the
new expressions at which they arrive, but also and more deeply
in the trajectories of their developments from their particular
pasts to their particular presents. (It is for this reason that Aristotle ranks the plot which traces these developments and the
character that is therein revealed - and not language or imagery
or diction - as the most important elements of serious narrative
investigations of human action, and Nussbaum as a reader joins
him in this thought.)
Second, there are facts of desire. David Copperfield's attractions to Steerforth and to Dora, Marcel's passion for Albertine,
and Chad's sexual love for Marie de Vionnet all testify to a
human susceptibility to being moved by a particular other.
Parents and children likewise play highly particularized roles as
objects of central concern and relationship for us. Expressing
and sustaining such passions or coping with their refusal are
central shaping activities of human lives. It is not clear how the
promptings of these passions are to be reconciled to either the
possibilities of expression that these characters find historically
available or to the demands of a more impersonal morality.
There is something, Nussbaum finds, of the private and inarticulable about them (351-52), and she confesses to some unsureness about how to balance the claims of passion and particularity
against those of morality and generality (50-53). Yet there
they are.
Third, there are ideals. Human beings are not prisoners of
their histories and biologies. They have capacities of imagination and reflection that free them from full control by their constraints. Hence ideal but currently unavailable possibilities of
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life can guide our responses to the imperfect situations that we
confront: "'unavailable' does not imply 'irrelevant'" (64).
Fourth, there is luck. What Nussbaum calls "uncontrollable
happenings" matter. Whether one's child dies, whether one's
former lover happens to be at home to receive a telephone call
during a brief visit to New York, whether the object of one's passion has the sensibility and aspirations to return it, whether the
social world makes possible forms of action that enable the
expression of human personality-these kinds of happenings
and states of affairs shape the lives of human agents attempting
to realize their best human possibilities.
Finally, in blending all of these - history with biology with
ideality, national, class, and geographic character with particular passion with justice, everywhere under the influence of
luck-there are still facts of human character: courage and creativity and love, or their refusals.
It is obtuse to deny the roles of these constraints and forces
in shaping a human life. Or perhaps, Nussbaum suggests, principally through a· magnificent reading of Plato's Protagoras,
such a denial- indulged in by utilitarians, rational preference
theorists, behaviorists, and other measurers of value - is a possible human act of intellectual desperation and self-mutilation.
Better or easier, some think, to have a univocal measure of value
than to acknowledge the salience in human life of incommensurable forces and constraints along with the risks and responsibilities that such forces and awareness of them bring. Nothing, as
Stanley Cavell has insisted, is more human than to deny the
human. 2
Once we see human lives as courageous or cowardly, creative
or routine, loving or narcissistic responses to such constraints
and forces, then the treatise, the favored form of philosophical
expression in modernity, immediately becomes less attractive as
a vehicle of human understanding of human possibilities.
Instead it will be "texts that narrate the experiences of beings
committed to value" (149), novels and perhaps related historical
and biographical works of sustained narration, that will have the
most to show us about how we might best live in response to our
constraints and to the incommensurability of goods. "It is only
by following a pattern of choice and commitment over a relatively long period of time - as the novel characteristically does that we can understand the pervasiveness of ... conflicts [among
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qualitatively different actions or commitments, when ... one
cannot pursue both] in human efforts to live well" (37). Novels
and their kin, not treatises, are the central texts of psychegogia,
of the soul's education. It is through our emotional reactionsaversion, fearfulness, sympathy, grief, awe, love, reverence, or
boredom as may be - to narratives that we learn the best possibilities of human life and the best paths toward them that various contexts make available.
This account of our responses to novels and other sustained
narratives in one way resembles what has come to be called New
Historicism. Adopting a phrase from Henry James, Nussbaum is
happy along with critics inspired by a blend of Marx and Foucault to speak of a "projected morality" of either an individual
text or a genre (10). Both individual texts and whole genres
induce in their readers responses to historical phenomena that
are typical perhaps of certain social classes. Greek tragedy in
general and Sophocles in particular induce in readers with certain sensibilities and interests a sense of awe at and identification
with those who seek to transcend natural limitations, coupled
with a sense of relief or appropriateness at their ultimate downfall. The modern novel, with James and Proust as its supreme
practitioners, induces in certain readers an identification with
those undergoing the vicissitudes of individual character formation and a sense of shared triumph with those who successfully
discover or create their personalities, becoming individuals
against a background of social convention. It is surely right, as
New Historicists have insisted, to locate our interest in and
responsiveness to the modern novel as in part a function of the
rise of a modern society, in which more scope is given to the
development of certain sorts of individual personality than was
typical in feudal economies.
But there is also a central difference between Nussbaum and
the New Historicists. Where New Historicists are typically
interested in explaining both our responses to individual works
and the rises and falls of whole genres as functions of the independent emergence and attenuation of certain forms of social
life, Nussbaum in contrast regards the texts in which she is interested as tracings of possibilities that are not external to us. For
her, we face the same problems of human life-of choosing
between static harmony or a life lived in awareness of death and
loss, or between patient domesticity and reckless adventurism,
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or between intimacy and public egalitarianism - that have been
faced by Odysseus and Maggie Verver, by Hyacinth Robinson
and Marcel.
It is this sense of our having something to learn from the
particularities of novels in which standing human problems are
canvassed that separates Nussbaum from both New Historicists
and more traditional ethical theorists. Unlike New Historicists,
postmodernists, social constructionists, and their kin, she
retains "a deep commitment to getting somewhere" rather than
resting content simply to "stop with an enumeration of differences and with the verdict that we cannot fairly compare,
cannot rationally decide" (28). Unlike modern philosophical
theorists of reason-sanctioned more or less algorithmic rules
and principles, where incommensurabilities are denied in the
interest of hewing to action-guiding calculations, she holds that
there is no more direct route to a reasonable understanding of
what it is for a human being to live well than working through
our various emotional responses to various sustained narratives
of quite different drifts. Deliberation, according to Nussbaum,
need not be and at bottom isn't "either quantitative or a mere
shot in the dark" (60). It involves instead "'getting the tip'" from
cases, wherein "progress comes not from the teaching of an
abstract law but by leading the friend, or child, or loved one - by
a word, by a story, by an image -to see some new aspect of the
concrete case at hand, to see it as this or that" (160). The genre
of philosophical criticism of the novel of which she is our most
eminent current practitioner involves taking up these tips from
various cases, setting them "side by side," both interrogating
and letting oneself learn from manifold stories at hand and our
complex, powerful, and ambivalent responses to them. I cannot
think of any better way, any way more faithful to the reversals
and triumphs of human life, in which to do moral philosophy
than this.
Nonetheless there are, as there always are, certain themes in
Love's Knowledge that are for me regions of concern. I will mention two.
The first is that in holding that the possibilities of contextual
human development that are displayed in the careers of the protagonists of the novels she surveys are not external to us, Nussbaum is committed further to holding that there are at some
level certain perennial problems of human life. But what are
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these problems? I am inclined to wish for more articulation of
them, perhaps along a slightly different line from the one Nussbaum takes. It is useful here to compare her sense of the persistent problems of human life with Kant's. In the Critique of
Judgement Kant writes that "the concept of freedom is meant to
actualize in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws." 3
(Passages like this lead me to think, by the way, that it is a mistake on Nussbaum's part to regard "What is my moral duty?" as
"Kant's organizing question" in moral philosophy [24].) This
passage says, among other things, that we are not as agents content to rest with an empty or unrealized freedom, but instead
seek to express our free personality in the world in such a way
that it receives ratification or recognition, and we seek further to
discover whether and how the natural and social worlds might
support this ambition. One way to read novels and other sustained narratives is then to see their protagonists as concerned
with the enduring problem of expressing and winning ratification for their free personality, against the obstacles to doing this
that the natural and social worlds variously throw up at various
times and places. 4 Insofar as all human beings have this aim of
expressing their free personality, and insofar as certain protagonists develop powerful strategies in context for winning
through to better forms of expression than are typical in their
times and places, we then have something to learn from these
protagonists.
In place of this sort of Kantian account of the enduring problems of humanity, Nussbaum instead offers us largely reformulations and revisions of Aristotle's remarks on eudaimonia.
"The general answer to [the] question ['How should a human
being live?'] suggested by Aristotle himself is, 'In accordance
with all the forms of good functioning that make up a complete
human life.' The notion of good human functioning steers and
guides the inquiry at a deep level, focusing attention on certain
features of situations rather than others" (95). In contrast with a
Kantian view, this sense of the problems faced by human beings
seems to me both to overspecify and to underspecify our situation. The problems of human life are here overspecified to the
extent that the paradigms of good human functioning are drawn
from relatively narrow ranges, say from the most impressive
exemplars of the Greek aristocracy, or from intellectual life
only, or from the Jamesian world of the salon, or from the
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thought that good human functioning requires centrally the satisfaction of biological needs, such as those for food and clothing.
In each case, the successes in good human functioning that are
then canvassed seem too specific to certain historical epochs or
class configurations, and canvassing all of them together leaves
us less with a way of appreciating and integrating all these successes, as Nussbaum surely and rightly wishes it to, than it does
a hodgepodge. For all her insistence on the internal or anthropocentric objectivity of morality, in a way her procedure here
leaves her perhaps a bit too open to appropriation by New Historicists, who will see in all these divergent exemplars just the
projected but subjective moralities of various irreconcilable
interest groups.
Good human functioning is left underspecified to the extent
that the problems and interests that these divergent exemplars
share are relatively unarticulated. There are in Love's Knowledge
few paradigms of reconciliation among members of divergent
groups in the emergence of a shared commitment to equal justice, conceived as the equal chance for expressing free human
personality and having its expression supported and ratified.
"Politics is about using human intelligence to support human
neediness," where among our needs Nussbaum lists such things
as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education for children,
and property (373). Absent from this list is something like an
aspiration or need for a culture of political justice or equal freedom. There is perhaps something characteristically Greek, as
opposed to Christian, in this emphasis. Nussbaum seems to me
sometimes to value in her heroines such qualities as courage,
integrity, gaiety, and improvisatory alertness at the expense of
such qualities as fairness, reciprocity, and concern for equality.
This tendency is perhaps reflected in her response to David Copperfield where she rightly praises David's interest in Dora rather
than Agnes as part of his openness to the emotions, the private,
and the inarticulable, but in this praise fails to see, I think, how
uncomfortable both David and Dickens are with Dora, with an
attachment in which genuine reciprocity and human equality
are not possible (in part as a result of Dora's familial and cultural
background).
I have little doubt that on most substantive questions of political judgment Nussbaum and I would be in fairly close
agreement. She is clearly concerned with political justice and
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reasonable economic equality. She believes in these things. But
her protagonists do not show us much about how to integrate a
commitment to these ideals with their other commitments, or to
do better in doing this than those around them do, and the result
is that we get almost a laundry list of commitments that make
for good human functioning. To some extent the readings Nussbaum gives of extended narratives, particularly of The Princess
Cassamassima, take up these issues and develop a richer and yet
more universally shared conception of the problems faced by
human agents than is afforded by the Aristotelian background.
Perhaps her revisions of Aristotle and mine of Kant do not end
up in very different places. But perhaps also Kant's thoughts
about human agents and the problem of free personality would
be of some help here.
The second region of concern revolves around the question
"What is really doing the work in moving us toward Nussbaum's vision of the human person and its prospects?" In particular, is the effective, conviction-inducing structure of her
writing more that of an intellectual autobiography, a narrative
of the evolution of her concerns, or that of a comparative theoretical study? There is no doubt that it is in places each of these
things. In various places, bits of autobiographical reflection
break out. She was, she tells us, an impassioned young reader,
alive with sympathies for the moral dramas of the great novels
and tragedies. She was both committed to the powers of systematic reason and brought up short by the various rigidities of
thought of academic moral philosophy and classics and literature. She has managed through her writing somehow to make
herself whole. This is quite a story, particularly for those who
had childhoods and graduate school experiences resembling
hers. At the same time, Nussbaum in places writes as a theorist
of our practical concerns, comparing and contrasting and adjudicating among the accounts of our concerns that are put forward in various literary and philosophical texts that serve as
inputs to be scrutinized by the theoretical consciousness (cf.
p. 290). Here the result- an elaboration or theory or account of
our human concerns - is achieved less through an odyssey or
narratable course of progress than it is through an almost timeless act of judgment among alternatives. One of her deepest
hopes, I think, is in the end to reject these questions - is her
writing narrative or theory? is it autobiography or moral analy-
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sis? - and instead to produce a new mixed genre, one that lies
between and partakes of the strengths of both narrative and theoretical prose. She seeks instead a style that is "non-reductive,
and also self-conscious about its own lack of completeness, gesturing toward experience and toward the literary texts" but also
a style that canvasses "the distinctive features of novels in a way
that contrasts them with features of other conceptions" (49).
Perhaps the central question to ask in coming to terms with this
effort is "What happens in the reader's moments of sympathetic
engagement with and openness to learning from it?" Is it that
the reader judges the analysis worthwhile according to some
implicit and intellectually articulable criterion of worth, moral
or aesthetic or both together? Or is it that the reader instead
finds herself in the course of her progress already engaged and
sympathetic-in love with the text one might call it-before
comparative analysis gets going? It may be, I think, that it is
more the latter, and that this fact has consequences for the
appropriate character of texts of the most serious human wisdom, pushing them even more toward the narrative and novelistic than Nussbaum's mixed genre. One might ask, "Can
philosophy become literature and still know itself?" 5
In a wonderful reading of an Ann Beattie short story, Nussbaum herself describes the process of acquiring love's knowledge, where this includes both knowledge of what love is and the
knowledge that is involved in being in love. "Knowledge of love
is not a state or function of the solitary person at all, but a complex way of being, feeling, and interacting with another person"
(274). Entering into this way of being involves deliberately not
insisting on criteria of judgment, but instead a willingness and
ability to "stop stopping" what will happen (278), the simultaneous discovery and creation of newly actualized possibilities of
human value. "Reading a story is like that" (280). And if it is,
and if reading stories is central to entering into valuable ways of
being, and if entering into these ways of being is fundamental in
a well-led human life, then stopping stopping what will happen
is likewise fundamental to acquiring and enacting human wisdom. This is not the image of wisdom and its acquisition that is
central in modern philosophy. But I did not want Love's Knowledge to stop, and I find myself trusting its progress as much as
that of any work of moral thinking of recent times.
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NOTES
A shortened version of these comments (originally presented before the American Society for Aesthetics, November 1991) will appear in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 52, number 2 Oune 1992).
1. This title quotes the title of the ninth essay of Nussbaum's collection, on
Dickens, itself a near quotation of a remark of David Copperfield's about his own
boyhood habits of reading. All further references to Love's Knowledge will be
given in the text in page numbers in parentheses.
2. See Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason (Oxford University Press, 1979),
pp. 109,207.
3. Immanuel Kant, The Critique ofJudgement, trans. J.C. Meredith (Oxford
University Press, 1928), p. 14.
4. I take up this way of reading in On Moral Personhood: Philosophy, Literature, Criticism and Self-Understanding (University of Chicago Press, 1989). For
related readings of Victorian novelists from Dickens to Joyce, see Philip M.
Weinstein, The Semantics of Desire (Princeton University Press, 1984).
5. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 496.

